I asked for help to return safely to my work. Why was I still pleading in November 2022?

On 15 November 2022, I sent another account to both SIRA NSW and SafeWork NSW, of what had happened after I reported workplace psychosocial hazards and made a workers’ compensation claim. I also asked for something I had sought throughout: action that would allow me to recover and return safely to my work and my university community.

The document brought together correspondence from 2020 and 2021. Reading the dates in sequence raises questions about how my claim was handled, what happened to the insurer’s injury management plan, and why my repeated requests for help had still not produced a safe path back to work.

——

A plan issued, but where was the support?

Catholic Church Insurance (CCI) issued an Injury Management Plan on 25 June 2020. Its goal was a return to my pre-injury duties. I wanted to work with my treating professionals, a case manager, a return-to-work coordinator and rehabilitation support to make that possible. In my November 2022 account, I said the plan had never been implemented.

The claim form itself became another source of distress. I had reported my injury and submitted my first certificate of capacity in May 2020. Yet, as my 2 October 2020 email to CCI records, I had only learned about the claim form through WIRO on 1 October 2020. I sent the form to CCI the next day.

By then, I told the insurer, I had used my personal, annual and long service leave, was facing financial distress, and remained exposed to the employer conduct I had reported. I wrote:

“I request clear communication, updates and transparency with the next steps in the process from this moment on.”

CCI confirmed on 6 October 2020 that it had received my claim form. This claim form, and knowledge about its existence, had been withheld from me since the start of the claim in late May 2020. I continued to seek information about its requests to my doctor, the medical evidence it held and when it would make a decision. My 21 October 2020 response challenged several statements relayed by CCI, including whether it had requested clinical notes. CCI declined the claim on 22 October 2020, according to the chronology I compiled.

These exchanges deserve careful examination. A worker trying to recover should be able to find out what the insurer needs, what action it has taken and who is coordinating the return-to-work process.

——

The questions I kept asking

On 13 January 2021, I complained to WIRO about CCI’s handling of my claim. I said the insurer’s failure to communicate and cooperate had left me exposed to further distress while I was trying to return safely to work. After CCI responded, I asked why I hadn’t been assigned a case manager to carry forward the June 2020 plan.

I put that question directly to CCI through IRO on 18 October 2021:

“Why did CCI not assign a case manager to me from July 2020, to communicate with my GP and psychologist, and implement the injury management plan as agreed on 25 June 2020?”

I also asked why the psychologist’s return-to-work recommendations hadn’t led to action, why I had learned about the claim form months after reporting my injury, and how information from a factual investigation prepared for the insurer came to be proposed for use in an employer investigation. I had serious concerns about the handling of private information concerning me and my family.

Those were requests for specific explanations. I wanted the records checked and answers given in writing.

——

The cost of being passed between systems

My November 2022 account describes attempts to obtain help from the insurer, IRO, SIRA, SafeWork NSW and others. I reported the conduct I experienced as harassment and adverse action, and I asked for it to stop. I remained concerned that responsibility for my safety and recovery was being passed around while the harm continued.

In correspondence from August 2021, I wrote to CCI about what workers’ compensation was meant to achieve: helping an injured worker recover safely at work. I asked the insurer to act on its injury management plan, address my lost leave and help me return to my substantive role. By October 2021, my request through IRO was painfully simple:

“Give us the start of good news, transparency and positive action.”

On 15 November 2022, I was still asking for my entitlements, my workplace support network and a safe return to the work I had done for two decades. I described being frightened, financially strained and distressed by the continuing “process”. And I still didn’t receive answers to my questions about CCI’s obligations or restore the workplace support I sought and needed for my recovery.

I have raised allegations of serious misconduct and possible fraud. Those allegations require an independent examination of the evidence and fair responses from the organisations concerned. They should neither be accepted nor dismissed without that work being done.

The question remains: 

What happened to the 25 June 2020 Injury Management Plan, and why did I have to keep pleading for clear communication, protection and a safe way to recover in my work?

Source: contemporaneous record of events - Document 562.

Two More Emails to ACU Governance: Who Was Listening? - November 2022

On 9 November 2022, I wrote to ACU governance because I couldn’t get the communication, cooperation or action I had been seeking. On 15 November 2022, I followed up with direct questions about the Associate Director of HR, privacy violations, adverse action and ACU’s responsibilities as an employer.

As my story shows, these were not my first attempts to raise concerns. I had reported psychosocial hazards affecting my health and safety on 2 July 2019. By November 2022, I had also provided the Fair Work Ombudsman with a timeline and records. I was asking the people above the Associate Director of HR to examine what had happened and act.

——

9 November 2022: I asked governance to intervene

In my first email, I told governance that I had gone elsewhere to be heard. I questioned why ACU’s policies for complaints about serious misconduct by executive staff didn’t appear to be protecting me. As I put it:

“Policies like complaints about serious misconduct of executive staff are not required only for show. They are meant to be applied and enforced.”

I raised the conduct I had reported within HR, the privacy violations that had occurred, and my concerns about the actions of ACU and Catholic Church Insurance. I told governance that payments and support were being withheld while I was trying to recover safely and return to the job I had performed for twenty years.

I also explained that an insurer case manager had provided an injury management plan to me and my health professionals. After she left, I couldn’t obtain the communication and cooperation needed to put that plan into effect. I had repeatedly tried to get the employer and insurer to work with me. Why did it seem that I was the only party expected to keep trying?

Meanwhile, I was using my personal, annual and long service leave. I had a mortgage and bills to pay. I was frightened about what would happen to me and my family if those with the power to act continued to leave these matters unresolved.

I addressed Professor Zlatko Skrbis and Professor Ramsay by name. I asked them to listen. I also asked that my friend and colleague in the Directorate of Identity and Mission be “allowed” to call me. It should not have required permission. The forced isolation I am STILL experiencing is causing me SERIOUS HARM. It’s forseeable harm that’s continuing by those governing the university! I wrote:

“I’m alone and I’m frightened and governance are responsible for this.”

That was a direct appeal for human contact as well as action. I needed a safe path back to my workplace and the community I still belonged to.

——

15 November 2022: Questions I asked again

Six days later, I wrote to governance again. I asked whether its leaders were aware of the privacy violations, discrimination and adverse action I had reported concerning the Associate Director of HR. I said that I had raised these concerns within ACU and with the Fair Work Ombudsman, providing a timeline and records.

I asked:

“How is this aligned to the mission and values of ACU?”

I also asked how tolerating the psychosocial hazards and financial harm I was reporting could be reconciled with being a responsible employer. 

I questioned what ACU’s staff code of conduct and commitments to dignity and ethics meant if governance did not examine serious complaints about its own executive staff.

My email asked:

“Where is the zero tolerance regarding discrimination and serious privacy breaches?”

And I described the isolation I was experiencing:

“Stop the psychological abuse of workplace mobbing. It’s like forcing someone to be in solitary confinement.”

I’ve worked honourably for the university community for twenty years. I was seeking protection for my health and safety, and cooperation with an injury management plan. I’ve continually pleaded to remain connected to my workplace. 

ACU senior leaders had legal obligations. Their lack of due diligence has caused harm that was foreseeable. 

And it’s continuing. ACU governance have been fully aware for years. 

——

What did ACU governance do with these warnings?

The sequence matters. On 9 November 2022, I gave governance a detailed account of the injury management plan, my efforts to obtain cooperation, the loss of leave and my fear. On 15 November 2022, I pressed it again with questions about the Associate Director of HR and the standards ACU says it upholds.

What did Vice Chancellor Professor Skrbis, DVC Professor Ramsay and ACU governance do with those emails? 

Who examined the timeline and records I had provided? 

Who investigated the privacy and adverse action concerns? 

Who checked whether ACU and its insurer were cooperating to implement the injury management plan? 

Who considered the harm of leaving me isolated while I was asking for help?

I asked for a safe work environment. I asked for the injury management plan to be implemented. I asked for human contact and a way to recover in the university community I’ve been part of and served for twenty years.

Those requests deserved a serious, accountable response. 

Why was no response forthcoming yet again?

See also posts like:

http://mystory-myvoice.blogspot.com/2025/06/the-decision-maker-now-vice-chancellor.html

http://mystory-myvoice.blogspot.com/2026/04/vice-chancellor-on-notice-delivered.html

http://mystory-myvoice.blogspot.com/2026/05/on-noticeagain-what-leadership-knew.html

Source: contemporaneous record of events - Documents 557-558.

Clayton Utz’s Past Conduct — Part 3: AMP, an “Independent” Report and the Records ASIC Sought

In Part 2, I wrote about an expert witness whose independence was examined in the Kazaa case. This final part turns to a different kind of independence: an investigation commissioned by an organisation into its own conduct. 

I have written about my family’s experience of an investigation arranged by my university and about the questions we were left asking when the people who made the complaint were not interviewed. The AMP matter is separate from ours. I’m examining it because the word “independent” was also central to what the public and a regulator were told.

——

The report commissioned by AMP

In June 2017, AMP appointed Clayton Utz to investigate matters connected with its practice of charging some customers ongoing service fees when the services hadn’t been provided. The letter appointing Clayton Utz called for an external and independent investigation and said it would be independent of the business being examined.

Clayton Utz prepared a report for AMP. In its September 2018 interim report, the Financial Services Royal Commission examined the report’s drafting and AMP’s subsequent presentation of it to the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, ASIC.

The Commissioner proceeded on the basis that there had been 22 different drafts. He recorded that AMP made many suggestions about their content, including marked-up drafts and proposed amendments. Some proposed changes appeared to concern what the report said about senior executives’ knowledge and involvement. (https://www.royalcommission.gov.au/system/files/2020-09/volume-2.pdf).

A signed report was sent to AMP on 6 October 2017. The Royal Commission recorded a further request for changes after that, including a proposed statement concerning what AMP’s then chief executive knew. Another signed report was supplied on 16 October. AMP then presented the report and Clayton Utz’s letter of instructions to ASIC.

I find that sequence difficult to pass over. If an investigation is described to a regulator as independent, the regulator needs to understand the nature and extent of the commissioning organisation’s involvement in its final report.

——

What the Royal Commission said—and did not say

The Commissioner considered that AMP may have made false representations to ASIC about the character of the Clayton Utz report. He said it might be open to conclude, given the number and nature of the changes to drafts, that AMP knew the report was not independent. He also said that such conduct, if established, might amount to misconduct.

Those are carefully qualified conclusions. The Commissioner didn’t make a finding of misconduct against a Clayton Utz partner in connection with the report. He expressly noted that he hadn’t heard evidence from the relevant AMP leaders or from a Clayton Utz partner and made no findings about their individual conduct.

Clayton Utz’s position was also reported at the time. A report in The Australian said the firm rejected the suggestion that its investigation or report to AMP’s board had been compromised. The firm’s position distinguished independence from the AMP business unit under investigation from independence of AMP as the client commissioning the work.

That distinction is at the heart of my question. 

When an institution says an investigation is “independent”, independent of whom, in what respects, and with what limits on the institution’s ability to influence the report?

——

The interview notes ASIC sought

The story didn’t end with the Royal Commission.

In October 2018, ASIC issued a notice requiring Clayton Utz to produce records connected with interviews the firm had conducted with current and former AMP personnel. AMP claimed the records were protected by legal professional privilege. Clayton Utz didn’t produce them on that basis, and ASIC disputed the privilege claim.

In December 2018, ASIC applied to the Federal Court for orders concerning the records. On 7 March 2019, Clayton Utz produced the interview notes sought by ASIC without AMP maintaining a privilege claim over them. AMP agreed to pay ASIC’s costs, and the proceedings were dismissed by consent the following day. (https://www.asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2018-releases/18-379mr-asic-challenges-amp-and-clayton-utz-over-failure-to-produce-documents, https://asic.gov.au/about-asic/news-centre/find-a-media-release/2019-releases/19-052mr-amp-and-clayton-utz-surrender-in-asic-court-battle-over-failure-to-produce-documents)

That outcome should be described accurately. The court didn’t decide that Clayton Utz had unlawfully withheld the notes. They were produced before that question was determined. ASIC nevertheless said it was disappointed that the matter hadn’t been resolved sooner and explained why access to records matters to its investigations.

——

Why I’m writing about this

I have described in earlier posts how an investigation arranged by my employer affected my family.

I’m asking a question that applies to any organisation using the language of “independence” to “reassure” people affected by its conduct. 

Who chooses the investigator? 

Who sets the terms? 

Who is interviewed? 

Who sees the drafts? 

Who can suggest changes? 

And what records can be examined if the description of the investigation is challenged?

Those questions are not answered by placing the word “independent” on a report. They’re answered by a “process” that can withstand scrutiny.

That’s why the AMP matter belongs in this series. The Royal Commission examined what happened between the commissioning organisation and the report’s authors. ASIC then sought the underlying interview notes. 

Independence was tested against the records, not accepted as a label.

People asked to “trust” an investigation deserve the same seriousness about how it was conducted.

Sources

• Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry, Interim Report, Volume 2, 28 September 2018, “Fees for no service: AMP”, particularly section 1.10.2.

• Merritt, C., “Banking royal commission: Clayton Utz ready for ‘real story’ on AMP report,” The Australian, 26 April 2018.

• Thomson, J., “AMP may have misled ASIC on amended Clayton Utz report,” The Australian Financial Review, 29 September 2018. 

• ASIC, “ASIC challenges AMP and Clayton Utz over failure to produce documents,” 17 December 2018.

• ASIC, “AMP and Clayton Utz surrender in ASIC court battle over failure to produce documents,” 11 March 2019.

Clayton Utz’s Past Conduct — Part 2: The Kazaa Case and the Independence of an Expert Witness

In Part 1, I looked at the Rolah McCabe tobacco litigation and the ethics review Clayton Utz announced after the original trial judgement. The next case in the references I previously published on this blog concerns something different: the preparation of an expert witness’s evidence.

An expert is called to assist a court with matters outside ordinary knowledge. In the Kazaa copyright case, one of those matters was how the music sharing technology worked. Professor Keith Ross, a computer scientist, gave evidence for parties represented by Clayton Utz.

The question raised by his evidence was one I find deeply troubling: 

if lawyers help prepare an expert’s report, how can the court be sure the opinions remain the expert’s own?

——

What the court saw

On 5 September 2005, Justice Murray Wilcox delivered judgement in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. During the hearing, Professor Ross had been questioned about exchanges with a Clayton Utz solicitor concerning a draft of his expert report.

The judge described one exchange in particular. Professor Ross had written a sentence about how parts of the Kazaa system worked. A solicitor crossed it out and suggested a different technical explanation. Professor Ross responded that he had not been aware of that explanation, even after testing, but accepted it on the solicitor’s say-so. (See https://www.steptoe.com/a/web/1235/2051.pdf). 

That suggested wording didn’t simply appear unchanged in the final report. The correspondence showed a further exchange, and Professor Ross told the court that he would have needed more evidence before adopting the earlier suggestion. Justice Wilcox didn’t accept his explanation of what he had meant in the email.

The judge concluded that Professor Ross had been prepared to seriously compromise his independence and intellectual integrity. He considered it potentially unsafe to rely on Professor Ross’s evidence about a controversial matter, while expressly saying that his evidence shouldn’t be disregarded altogether. That was a finding about the expert witness’s reliability. It wasn’t a finding that Clayton Utz’s lawyers had fabricated evidence or committed professional misconduct (https://www.steptoe.com/a/web/1235/2051.pdf). 

That distinction matters, but so does the fact that the exchange happened at all.

——

What was reported about the lawyers

On 9 September 2005, Garth Montgomery reported in The Australian on the correspondence between Professor Ross and Clayton Utz. The article described lawyers supplying a starting draft, suggesting changes and discussing technical descriptions in the proposed evidence. It also reported Clayton Utz’s position that its suggestions were requests rather than directives, and that the firm denied wrongdoing.

On 16 September, The Australian reported that complaints concerning three Clayton Utz lawyers had been lodged with legal professional bodies and police over the preparation of Professor Ross’s evidence. The article also reported Clayton Utz’s response that the judgement contained no adverse finding about the firm’s conduct.

A further article in The Australian Financial Review on 23 September examined the email trail and the difference between testing an expert’s assumptions and improperly shaping an expert’s opinion. It noted that the disputed suggestion hadn’t made it into the final report and that Justice Wilcox’s adverse finding was directed at Professor Ross, not the firm.

Taken together, the reports raise a serious question while also showing why it can’t be answered by selecting only the most alarming email. The drafts, the final report, the expert’s own testing, the court’s reasoning and the firm’s response all matter.

——

Why this question stays with me

I have written about my own experiences with medico-legal “assessments” and reports. The Kazaa case is not evidence that the same thing happened in my circumstances, and I’m not suggesting the people involved in that case had any connection.

But it explains why the “independence” of a person presented as an expert matters so much to me. A report can carry authority because of the qualifications of the person whose name is on it. The court, the parties and the person affected need to be able to understand where that person’s own observations and conclusions end, and where suggestions from those instructing them begin.

Justice Wilcox was able to examine the correspondence and question Professor Ross about it in open court. That scrutiny exposed a problem with the expert’s willingness to accept a suggested technical assertion. It also allowed the court to make a careful distinction about what it had, and had not, found.

That’s the question I take from this case: 

when an expert report is used to influence a consequential decision, what access does the person affected have to the instructions, drafts and exchanges needed to assess whether the opinion is genuinely “independent”?

——

Sources

• Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242, Federal Court of Australia, 5 September 2005, especially paragraphs 226–231.

• Montgomery, G., “Clayton Utz in hot water over witness,” The Australian, 9 September 2005.

• Montgomery, G., “Clayton Utz trio facing inquiry,” The Australian, 16 September 2005.

• Priest, M., “Clayton Utz treads witness tightrope,” The Australian Financial Review, 23 September 2005.

Clayton Utz’s Past Conduct - Part 1: Destroyed Documents and the Promised Ethics Review

I have already written about what my family and I experienced when Clayton Utz became involved in our complaints to my university. In that post, I listed reports about other matters involving the firm. I want to look more closely at those reports now, beginning with the case of Rolah McCabe.

Mrs McCabe was dying of lung cancer when she sued British American Tobacco Australia. Her case raised a question that reaches far beyond tobacco litigation: what chance does a person have of receiving a fair hearing if documents that may matter to their case have been destroyed? 

Clayton Utz acted for British American Tobacco. On 22 March 2002, Justice Geoffrey Eames of the Supreme Court of Victoria ruled on Mrs McCabe’s application to strike out the company’s defence. His judgement examined the destruction of documents, the company’s document retention policy, and the role of its lawyers. He concluded that Mrs McCabe had been denied a fair trial and ordered that the defence be struck out. A jury subsequently assessed damages at $700,000.

The findings concerning Clayton Utz were serious. They were reported widely, and the firm disputed allegations that it had overseen document destruction or conspired to withhold evidence. One lawyer named in the judgement said he hadn’t been given an opportunity to answer adverse findings about him.

(NOTE: My family and I had no say in our complaints to ACU. Clayton Utz and their lawyers’ unethical interference played a role in that. What a double standard.)

On 6 December 2002, the Victorian Court of Appeal overturned the order striking out British American Tobacco’s defence and set aside the damages judgement. It directed that the case be sent back for a new trial. Mrs McCabe had died before that appeal judgement was delivered.

I don’t want to repeat the original findings as though they remained the final court ruling. Equally, I don’t want the appeal to erase the public questions that arose about document handling, legal advice and access to justice. Both stages belong in an honest account of this case.

——

What happened to the promised ethics review?

On 24 April 2002, The Australian Financial Review reported that Clayton Utz’s board had begun a broad internal review following Justice Eames’ judgement. The firm’s chief executive partner, David Fagan, said it would examine the judgement and the conduct of the case against the firm’s standards. He indicated that adverse findings could lead to internal action.

That was a consequential public assurance. When an organisation announces an ethics review in response to a judgement of this gravity, it’s reasonable to ask what the review examined, what it concluded and what action followed.

On 18 July 2002, Clayton Utz announced that it would close its tobacco claims litigation practice. Its own statement described this as a business strategy decision. It also said the internal review was continuing and that it would be inappropriate to finalise it before the appeal and the NSW Legal Services Commissioner’s investigation. Closing a practice and completing an ethics review are different things. What became of the review? 

The matter returned to public attention in December 2006. The ABC and The Australian Financial Review reported on leaked material said to come from a Clayton Utz internal inquiry. They reported allegations of serious professional misconduct concerning two former partners and an allegation that evidence given by one was potentially perjurious. The Victorian Attorney-General referred the material to the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider whether criminal charges were warranted, and to legal services regulators to consider possible professional misconduct.

A referral isn’t a criminal finding. A leaked account of an internal inquiry isn’t a published disciplinary decision. Clayton Utz said the leaked material concerned a preliminary review that had been superseded, and maintained that the appeal and legal regulator reviews had exonerated the firm and its lawyers. The reports I’ve compiled don’t establish the final outcome of the later DPP referral. (See also: https://www.tobaccoinaustralia.org.au/chapter-16-litigation/appendix-16-1-mccabe).

But the questions don’t disappear. If an ethics review was announced publicly, what findings, if any, were ultimately reached? How could the public understand the relationship between that announced review, the later leaked material, and the firm’s statement that it had been exonerated?

In a 4 August 2002 interview with Margaret Simons for the Sunday Age, Clayton Utz chief executive David Fagan set out how he saw the firm’s ethical responsibilities. He said lawyers must act within their professional duties, particularly their duty to the court, but that “we don’t take a moral stance” on behalf of a client. He described the decision to leave tobacco claims litigation as a business decision. At the same time, he said the firm’s core values were “honesty and integrity” and that it had carefully reviewed the McCabe judgement, although it wouldn’t finalise or discuss the review’s results while the appeal and regulatory investigation continued. The article also reported that Clayton Utz had established a professional excellence committee. I’m left asking: what did the promised review ultimately conclude, and what changed in the firm’s practice as a result?

——

Why I’m revisiting this

Rolah McCabe’s case isn’t my case, and the reports about it don’t prove what happened to my family or me. I’m revisiting it because I have experienced the imbalance that arises when an individual seeking answers faces an institution and its lawyers.

My own account is already on this blog. My family and I have described the communications we received and the effect they had on us. Here, I’m asking readers to look at a documented public case, its appeal, and the questions raised by a promised internal ethics review.

Mrs McCabe’s case deserves to be described with care. She was a person trying to have her claim heard while gravely ill. The trial judgement, the successful appeal, the firm’s responses and the later reports must all be part of the story.

For me, the question left by this first part is simple: 

when a powerful firm publicly promises to examine its own conduct, how can the people affected know what was learned and what changed?

——

Sources

• McCabe v British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd [2002] VSC 73, trial judgement⁠, 22 March 2002. https://assets.tobaccocontrollaws.org/uploads/litigation/Australia/AU_McCabe-v.-British-American-Tob.pdf 

• British American Tobacco Australia Services Ltd v Cowell [2002] VSCA 197, appeal judgement⁠, 6 December 2002. https://d3vqfzrrx1ccvd.cloudfront.net/uploads/litigation/Australia/AU_British-American-Tobacco-Austr.pdf

• Pheasant, B., “Clayton Utz to run ethics audit,” The Australian Financial Review, 24 April 2002.

• Clayton Utz, “Clayton Utz to close tobacco claims litigation practice⁠,” 18 July 2002.

• Simons, M., “Lawyers not moral judges – Clayton Utz chief,” Sunday Age, 4 August 2002. 

• Alberici, E., “Law firm Clayton Utz faces criminal investigation,” ABC, 21 December 2006.

• Drummond, M. and Moran, S., “Clayton Utz faces criminal probe,” The Australian Financial Review, 21 December 2006.